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J. M. Hendry* Regulatory Reform and the
National Energy Board
1. The Need for Regulation
Government regulation has been increasing rapidly for the past five
decades. At present, boards, commissions, and other variously
named administrative agencies pervade nearly every phrase of the
nation's economic and social activity. At the federal level, these
groups are involved in formulating economic policy; they control
the construction and operation of pipelines and other means of
transport; they supervise most facets of the telecommunications and
broadcasting industries; they regulate, in many ways, the
exploration for and manufacturing and marketing of raw materials.
At the provincial level, they are concerned with labour relations,
education, and the use of property. In addition, an assortment of fire
marshalls, engineers, inspectors, and registrars are among those
who operate under municipal ordinances to maintain property
according to certain guidelines, to regulate how and where
structures will be built and maintained and, in many circumstances,
to control how, when, and where individuals may operate
businesses.
The reasons offered for government regulation are many and may
be classified as economic, social, and political. The economic
reasons are probably foremost. The doctrine of laissez faire
economics, as enunciated by Adam Smith,' was implemented in the
early part of the nineteenth century in the form of predatory
individualism, unrestrained private initiative in business, cal-
culating and relentless competition, and above all, the absence of
government interference in these matters. The period of rapid
transport development, spreading settlement, and increased exploi-
tation of natural resources that occurred in the United States during
this era probably witnessed the peak of this form of laissez faire
economics. Along with the growth of business enterprise, which
was aided by the industrial development that was essential to the
*Formerly of the National Energy Board, Ottawa.
1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (4
Volumes, C. Knight, ed., 1843).
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wars during that period, the growth of monopolies was attracting
attention. Monopolies, particularly in the railways, levied excessive
and discriminatory charges on their customers and placed the
industries and individuals in the monopolized territory under the
complete control of one or more individuals or corporations.
Privately owned municipal services, such as water supply, local
transportation, and gas and electric services, also came under
scrutiny as these are fields of natural monopolies and, therefore,
were subject to abuse. In general, as cut-throat competition, rigged
markets, cooperative arrangements, and other unfair practices
increased, government regulation became more pronounced.
Consequently, unrestrained laissez faire economics have been
curtailed for some time. "Even before Confederation, the Province
of Canada had resorted to a type of non-departmental regulatory
body when it enacted a Railway Act in 1851, under which
regulatory functions, principally the approval of rates, were
assigned to a Board of Railway Commissioners .... ,,2 This
regulatory body was a prime example of administrative authority
exercised on behalf of the common good and in restriction of the
persistent, increasing powers and selfish, pecuniary interests of big
business. Since this time, government regulation has increased and,
since the latter part of the nineteenth century, government has not
hesitated to interfere where it was necessary. In some cases, public
knowledge of significant facts and the resulting pressure of public
opinion are sufficient to attain the desire results. But in some cases,
control must be achieved by issuing orders, licences, and
certificates. Although Adam Smith assumed that free competition in
production and marketing works as an automatic regulator of prices
(an assumption that may have been true in the era in which he
wrote), in practice there have always been circumstances which
interfere with free competition and the desired equilibrium of
demand and supply. There is no perfect state of competition and,
even if there was, questions could be raised as to whether social
goals would be best attained in that way. The control of prices and
rates, then, are the main economic concerns of regulation, and this,
for the most part, means preventing discrimination, monopolies, the
restraint of trade, and other forms of unfair business practices. As
mentioned previously, although the elimination of such practices
2. See Independent Administrative Agencies, Working Paper No. 25 (Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1980) at 2 1.
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generally requires direct regulatory action, other methods of
regulation may be used. For example, boards of arbitration and
conciliation are existing modes of attaining industrial peace. Their
success in Canada is due, to a great extent, to the effective
utilization of these regulatory processes by the groups concerned
and the fact that participation in them is voluntary.
Regulation in the realm of social affairs has become particularly
prevalent since the end of World War II and, especially, since 1965.
It has resulted from a combination of prosperity, the consequent
enthusiasm for social causes and concern for the plight of those in
our society who are less fortunate, the ability of the government to
combat and overcome these problems, and, perhaps above all, a
pervading concern for the environment. These factors led to the
creation of a number of agencies to deal with safety conditions and
remuneration in the work place, products standards, discrimination,
and pollution. Environmental assessment boards, workmen's
compensation boards, human rights commissions, and many other
such agencies are now commonplace. In addition, the government
uses many forms of regulation to attain its regulatory goals. It may
grant subventions, afford favourable tax treatment, or allow the
operations of a group to be exempt from generally applicable laws.
It may empower an individual, or group of individuals, to ascertain
the facts of a given situation and, in the light of those facts and in
conformity with certain standards, may grant or withhold economic
favours. The government may confer on individuals or groups of
individuals only those powers sufficient to perform defined advisory
roles, but no effective enforcing powers, such as those held by
boards of inquiry. Some agencies may be empowered to adjudicate
claims by individuals against the state or against employers, as
exemplified by the work of the Unemployment Insurance
Commission and the Workmen's Compensation Board.
Regulatory reform is a phrase that has many meanings. First, it
may be used to mean deregulation. Two authors of a recent study
use the phrase "to refer to (i) outright deregulation of industry-
specific controls over price and/or entry output; or (ii) substantial
liberalization of regime of direct regulation resulting in significantly
greater reliance on competition." 3 The proponents of deregulation
3. Stanbury, W.T. and Thompson, Fred, Regulatory Reform in Canada (Montreal:
The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982). See also W. T. Stanbury, ed.,
Government Regulation, Scope, Growth and Process, (Ottawa: 1980), passim.
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cite the costs of regulation as the main reason for curtailing it. They
point to the large quantity of economic resources that are regulated
by the government with no reference to the market. They refer to the
American efforts to deregulate, which began with the Ford
administration, were continued under President Carter, and which
constituted a major part of Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign
platform. They gleefully call attention to the large number of
regulations and can easily find absurd examples of conflicting,
needlessly rigid, and hopelessly antiquated regulations which,
because they have not been removed from the official records, still
technically exist. The proponents of deregulation also complain
about the numerous forms that are required by government
regulators to be filled out and the time and expense necessary to
comply with them. Although the status of deregulation is unclear in
the United States, the situation in Canada is clearer. Professors
Stanbury and Thompson write:
While the studies, official and otherwise, on regulation and
proposals for reform have been piling up, and while governments
have expressed their concern about the overlap and economic
burden of regulation, they have been also moving in the opposite
direction. Indeed, the penchant of Canadian governments for
intervention seems inexhaustible . . . The petroleum industry has
become another directly regulated industry in a country in which
29 per cent of the GDP at factor cost is already subject to a form
of price and/or entry controls by government.
4
It is submitted that deregulation, in its pure form, is wishful
thinking; it is a dream for the days (if such days ever existed) when
commercial activity and social welfare were completely uncon-
trolled. Although deregulation might be profitably undertaken in
particular economic areas, modem society demands some controls.
Most of us will agree that the model society is one that is based on
individualism, ownership of private property, and freedom of
contract, and which allows government intervention only to the
extent necessary to curb excesses and attain objectives for the
common good. But what are excesses? What is the common good?
These are political questions and, in western societies, their answers
are determined by political processes.
Political action usually results from the interaction of two
competing groups, those that advocate change and those that
advocate the maintenance of the status quo. During the past two
4. Ibid, note 3. Regulatory Reform in Canada, at 115.
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centuries, advocates of change have generally been seen as a force
that is necessary in order to curb the excessive powers that arise in
society from time to time. In the early part of the nineteenth
century, a group called for economic liberty from the then
predominant constraints of mercantilism and advocated laissez-faire
policies. But by the latter part of that century, the same group was
demanding government intervention to curb excesses, particularly
those of the corporations, which manifested themselves in rigged
markets, labour strife, unfair business practices, and what was at
that time considered to be generally anti-social behaviour. (By the
time of the economic depression of the thirties, this group, which
was called, among other epithets, liberal, liberal-democrat, and
socialist, stood for liberty, equality of opportunity, and social
justice for all. Its members advocated change and, of course, were
in conflict with those who advocated the status quo.) Satisfaction of
their demands, then, would have entailed a return to the status quo.
It is clear that complete deregulation may have a place in specific
areas where competition - that is, true competition - meets the
criterion of socially acceptable conduct. In such circumstances, the
market is the proper device with which to allocate goods and
services. However, although evidence of situations where regula-
tion has throttled competition and pushed up prices is easily
produced, regulation is not only desirable, but necessary when free
competition, for some reason, does not operate. Then it becomes
clear that, although the market has a place in the scheme of our
social order, so has economic planning. The solution, of course, is
to find some acceptable compromise between these conflicting
forces.
Government regulation is a prime method of attaining social
goals. At present, it appears that the philosophy of unrestricted
economic growth must give way, to some degree, to the welfare
ideal. In other words, the market economy must, to some extent, be
subordinated to the planned, democratic state. Since the end of
World War II, the evidence that the transition is well under way has
been impressive. At the very least, the concept that the nation-state
has broad responsibilities is now generally accepted, and the profit
motive and the marketplace are seen to be rational only in light of
the common good. In a society where the bulk of the denizens live
below the poverty line, some concept of need must be considered in
the distribution of goods and services. As a result, the welfare state,
the philosophy of which rests on satisfying the needs of many and
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the common good of all, is emerging. Planning and regulation are
necessary in the attainment of these goals. In the light of these
remarks it is evident that deregulation, in the sense used by
Professors Stanbury and Thompson, is a political matter; that is, it is
the result of the goals and aims of the collective group.
A consensus of the people will, no doubt, favour the elimination
of unnecessary costs, burdensome paperwork, and archaic and
outdated regulations that fulfill no function. It will generally favour
efficient management within a framework of free competition. But
the consensus will also favour control and regulation in
monopolistic and other discriminatory situations, and will support
reasonable social goals and regulations to effect these controls. It is
fair to say that the same consensus will not favour inefficient
government which manifests itself in the form of bad legislative
drafting, prolix or archaic rules, unnecessarily long and obscure
administrative procedures, or bad applications of the law. These are
the basic parameters of regulatory reform. Regulatory reform, then,
has one major purpose, namely, efficient government or administra-
tion. First, this requires careful, knowledgeable planning and
drafting of the enabling legislation. The principles upon which the
legislation is based must emerge clearly and in a precise form from
parliamentary discussion and committee investigation, and must be
afforded the time and means necessary to make good policy. These
principles will comprise the political framework within which it will
be determined whether or not the regulation is necessary and what
form it will take. Also included in the political process will be the
careful drafting of the legislation by legal experts, giving direction,
in as much detail as possible, to the regulators or the regulating
agency. Second, regulatory reform requires a continuing review of
the management of the affairs being regulated; this is regulatory
reform in its broadest sense. To ensure good management,
regulators and staff of the regulating agencies must be carefully
appointed. The enabling legislation must be accurately interpreted
by the regulators so that it serves the purpose Parliament intended it
to, and available techniques must be used to attain those objectives.
Good management also requires an outline both of the practices
which the regulators can utilize to arrive at administrative, advisory,
and regulatory decisions, and of how they are to perform their
legislative, administrative, and quasi-judicial functions.
We now turn to a study of the National Energy Board and to a
discussion of how regulatory reform is carried out in this agency.
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II. The Statutory Framework for Regulation by the National Energy
Board
The National Energy Board Act was passed by Parliament in 1959
after a long and acrimonious debate relating to the building of a
pipeline for the disposal of Alberta natural gas. 5 The act resulted
from the recommendations of two royal commissions. In 1957, the
Gordon Commission recommended the development of a com-
prehensive energy policy and the formation of a national energy
authority to advise the government on its long-term energy
requirements. And in 1958, the Borden Commission reported to
Parliament on the structure and control of pipelines and on the
regulation of prices and rates, all of which were relevant to ensuring
that the operation of interprovincial and international pipelines
would be efficient, economical, and in the national interest. The
resultant act was mainly based on two acts that it repealed. These
were the Pipelines Act of 1949,6 which dealt with the construction
of international and interprovincial pipelines, and the Exportation of
Powers and Fluids and Importation of Gas Act, 7 which was
concerned with the exportation of power and fluids, the importation
of gas, and the construction of facilities for the exportation of
power. Prior to the passing of the National Energy Board Act, lip
service was given, in debates in the House of Commons, to an
overall energy policy and to the consolidation of all governmental
functions in the energy field. However, the act contains no mention
of coal, atomic energy, or even electrical energy, other than a
reference to the construction of international power lines and the
export of electrical power.
To develop and implement the regulatory policy, the act created a
board consisting of seven members, since increased to eleven, each
of whom holds office for a term of seven years.8 The board is
presided over by a chairman who directs the activities of the board
and its staff, which is comprised of three hundred and fifty federal
public servants. Section 10 states that the board is a court of record.
As such, it has all of the powers, rights, and privileges that are
vested in a superior court of record with respect to the attendance of
witnesses, the swearing in and examination of witnesses, the
5. 1959 S.C. c. 46; R.S.C. 1970, c. N-6, (hereinafter "the act").
6. R.S.C. 1952, c. 21.
7. 1955 S.C.,c. 14.
8. 1980-81-82, S.C., c. 116.
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production and inspection of documents, the enforcement of its
orders, the entry upon and inspection of property, and other matters
deemed necessary or proper for the due exercise of its functions. By
issuing certificates, the National Energy Board regulates the
construction and operation of international and interprovincial oil
and gas pipelines. 9 It is also empowered to certify international
power lines, that is, lines that have a connection with those across
international borders. The standards or principles which the board
must apply in determining whether or not a certificate will be issued
are set forth in section 44 of the act. 10 They are extremely general,
but are the only policy guides available. The section also provides
that, before issuing a certificate, the board must be satisfied that the
power line is and will be required in light of present and future
public convenience and necessity and with regard to all relevant
circumstances. Under Part VI of the act, the board, by means of the
licencing system, regulates the exportation of gas, oil, electricity,
and certain oil products, as well as the importation of gas. The
board is guided in these activities by the general criteria in section
83 of the act, which require it to consider all relevant circumstances
and, in particular, to satisfy itself that enough energy sources will
remain in Canada for use in the reasonably foreseeable future and
that the price to be charged for the gas, oil, or power that is exported
is just and reasonable in relation to the public interest.
Part II of the act pertains to the advisory functions of the board. It
bestows wide powers on the board to prepare studies and reports and
to make recommendations on all aspects of energy under federal
jurisdiction, either on its own initiative or at the request of the
minister. For the purposes set forth in Part II, the board is given all
the powers under the Inquiries Act.' 1 Under section 50 of the act,
the board is empowered to make orders with respect to all matters
relating to traffic, tolls, and tariffs. Regulatory policy in this regard
is constrained by the statutory guidelines that the tolls be just and
reasonable, that they be charged equally under similar circum-
stances and conditions, and that they not be unjustly discriminatory.
9. See definitions in Hendry, Some Observations on the Canadian Regulatory
Agency (1976) 1 Dal. L. J. 3, 7.
10. Section 44, inter alia, requires the board to take into account all such matters
that it deems relevant, including the availability of gas, oil, or electricity as the case
may be, the existence of markets, the economic feasibility of the pipeline, the
applicant's financial responsibility and structure, Canadian participation in the
project, and any public interest.
11. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-13.
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Finally, the act provides for a broad regulatory power over such
matters as the supervision of the safety of pipeline operation, the
approval of contracts limiting liability, and the crossing of pipelines
by other utilities. The regulatory power of the board also extends to
the granting of orders for the exportation and importation of gas,
oil, and electricity, where circumstances demand expeditious
handling and where the more formal procedures required for the
granting of licences are not considered necessary.
In summary, the regulatory policy, as expressed in the act, is
quite general. It sets up an administrative agency, to which it gives
general powers and only a few standards and guidelines as to how
that policy should be developed and implemented. The general
nature of the mandate is not surprising when one recalls the reasons
for the existence of such agencies, namely, the quantity of work
involved, the expertise required, the need for intensive investiga-
tion, and, perhaps foremost, the need to develop policies in
particular areas where the government, for some reason, has not. As
Professor Willis, an acknowledged authority in the field, has said:
(They), at first sight, look like courts in that they hold hearings
and apply statutory standards - such as 'fit and proper person',
'public convenience and necessity', 'just and reasonable rates',
'in the public interest' and so on, to the facts of individual cases
coming before them but are in reality minor legislative bodies
pricking out a policy. 12
(a) The Regulation of Oil
In 1966, the Canadian government announced its National Oil
Policy.' 3 The aim of this policy was to create a favourable climate
within which Canada's large, indigenous oil reserves were to be
developed. The objective was to be achieved by encouraging the
increased use of Canadian oil in domestic markets west of the
Ottawa Valley, and by expanding exports with as little disruption of
normal trade patterns as possible. The government stated that
participation in the program would occur on a voluntary basis, and
instructed the National Energy Board to evaluate any activity and to
report periodically on any progress. In the early years, industry was
quite successful at meeting the policy's objectives. However, since
1964, oil companies, particularly those that produced gasoline,
moved from the area east of the Ottawa Valley into the area west of
12. Administrative Law in Canada (1962) 39 Can. B. R. 251, 260.
13. See, for example, Canadian National Energy Board Report (1962) at 13ff.
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the valley in increasing numbers. These moves and the risk of
similar action by companies which had been complying with the
policy, but which had become increasingly concerned about the
apparent inequities in the situation, led to the proclamation on May
7, 1970, under section 87 of the National Energy Board Act, to
facilitate enforcement of the National Oil Policy.14
This proclamation had the effect of extending the licencing
provisions of the National Energy Board to the importation and
exportation of oil and oil products. However, amendments to the
National Energy Board Part VI Regulations, which were made by
the governor-in-council at the same time, restricted this effect. 15
The amendments provided for the licencing, by the board, of
imports of gasoline into those areas designated Regions I and II (the
Maritime provinces and Quebec, respectively, although Region II
included a small portion of Ontario) and Region III (which included
the greatest proportion of Ontario). They also made the licences
subject to the condition that transfer of gasoline from Regions I and
II to Region III be allowed only with the written consent of the
board. Early in 1970, Caloil Inc. of Montreal instituted an action in
the Exchequer Court of Canada for these regulations to be declared
unconstitutional and invalid. The president of the Exchequer Court,
Mr. Justice Jackett, agreed, and held that the regulations were
invalid because they purported to regulate the marketing of oil and
oil products within a province and were not confined to the
regulation of imported oil and oil products. 16 Immediately after this
decision, the board amended the regulations to remove those
features held, in Mr. Justice Jackett's judgment, to be
objectionable.' 7 Shortly thereafter, the newly amended regulations
were contested by the same company, Caloil Inc., in the Exchequer
Court. Mr. Justice Dumoulin of that court upheld the validity of the
new regulations, stating that, as the federal authority has the power
to prohibit the entry of certain products into the country, so it also
has the power to specify the quantity, time, and area of consumption
of the imported products, which include oil and oil products, from
the point of purchase to the point of consumption. 18
14. Canadian Gazette, Part II, 2215-70, at 558.
15. C. R. C. (1978) Vol. XI, c. 1056.
16. Caloil Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada (1970) Ex. C. R. 512.
17. These regulations have since been repealed.
18. Caloil Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada (1970) Ex. C. R. 534. An appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed; S.C.R. (1971), 543.
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When international oil prices rose to unprecedented heights in
1973, it was quickly decided that Canadians should not pay the
world market price for domestic oil consumed in Canada. However,
in order to obtain the world price for oil on the export market, the
federal government instituted an oil export tax. The authority for
this tax was originally found in a House of Commons ways and
means motion, but was eventually incorporated into Part I of the
Energy Administration Act. 19 This part of the act, inter alia,
provides for the imposition of a tariff applicable to various kinds
and qualities of oil and oil products. Every month, the board makes
a report to the minister, who considers the relevant circumstances
and makes his recommendation to the governor-in-council in the
form of a tariff of charges for that month. In practice, the board
determines the reasonable price for domestic consumption and, by
using various criteria, arrives at the export charge. These tariffs are
published regularly in the Canada Gazette.
Although Canadian consumers of oil have been sheltered from
the world price, it is still economical to import into eastern Canada
some three million barrels of oil per day at the world price, which,
at the time of this writing, is thirty-four dollars a barrel. In order to
compensate Canadian refiners for the difference between the world
price and the Canadian price, a compensation program was devised
and put into place under Part IV of the Energy Administration Act.
Briefly, a board, originally called the Petroleum Administration
Board, pays importers the difference between the average domestic
price, including transportation charges, and the world price. 20 The
foreign price is calculated on the basis of a three-month moving
average of the cost of the oil, its source, and its type.
(b) The Regulation of Gas
Pursuant to section 83 of the act, before granting licences for the
exportation of gas, the board is required, inter alia, to consider the
amount of gas that will remain after the export authorizations have
been given. Because the quantities of gas to be exported must be
deemed by the board to be surplus and because projections of future
gas needs must be based on estimates, the board has considerable
discretion in the matter. During the 1960s and early 1970s, surplus
was calculated by comparing available reserves with the amount
19. Originally passed as the Petroleum Administration Act, A.C. (1975), c. 47,
and now called the Energy Administration Act, S.C. (1980-81-82), c. 114.
20. Ibid, (1980-81-82), c. 114, s. 80.
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that was twenty-five times greater than the Canadian demand
projected for the fourth year of the forecast plus the quantity
proposed for export. This was known as the 25A4 formula. In the
Report on Natural Gas Supply, released in February 1979, the
board noted that the rate at which reserves would be produced (that
is, their deliverability) had become the limiting factor in estimating
requirements. The board provided three tests, the Current Reserves
Test, the Current Deliverability Test, and the Future Deliverability
Test, all of which had to be met before authorization would be
granted. In its report following the Gas Export Omnibus Hearing of
1982, the board further modified its surplus determination
procedure. As a result, the surplus calculation was nearly doubled
and the export of almost twelve trillion cubic feet of natural gas to
the United States and, for the first time, a small amount to Japan
was authorized.
Prior to the recent amendments, section 83 of the act provided
that the board should satisfy itself that the price to be charged was
just and reasonable in relation to the public interest. 21 In the late
1950s and in the 1960s, much concern was generated about the
export price of gas sold to customers in the United States. This price
was predominantly set by the market price that United States'
domestic gas received on interstate markets. These sales were made
near the end of an era during which the United States, because it
was basically self-sufficient in energy, was pursuing energy pricing
policies that were largely independent of world energy prices. At
that time, Canada had to accept what was later termed a "distress
price" for the gas exports in order to make the construction of a
major gas pipeline viable. 22 Because the reasonableness of this
price was questionable, the government, notwithstanding the
express words of section 83 of the act, amended the National
Energy Board Part VI Regulations. 23 This new amendment provides
that all licences shall be subject to the condition that the prices to be
charged for gas are to be continually reviewed by the board, and, on
reporting an increase in the price to the governor-in-council, that
price may, by order, be made a condition of the licence, such that
the gas cannot be exported at a lower price.
21. This test is now deleted from section 83 of the act in respect of oil and gas. See
note 11, supra.
22. See, for example, Reasons for Decision in the Matter of the Application by
Westcoast Transmission Company, Limited (1968).
23. See note 15 ,supra, s. 14.
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An integral part of the price charged for gas is the rates or tolls
that are charged for its transportation. Under Part IV of the act,
companies are prohibited from charging tolls, except those that are
specified in a tariff that has been filed with the board and which is in
effect. In addition, all tolls must be just and reasonable and must be
charged without unjust discrimination. The determination of these
costs comprises a major portion of the work of the board, as the
proceedings to determine just and reasonable rates or tolls usually
require lengthy hearings, during which details of the applicant's
total service costs, rate structure, rate design, and rate of return
must be heard. Where the product being transported is owned by
some third party, as it is in the case of most oil pipeline companies,
the determination of the costs is relatively straightforward.
However, where the product is owned by the company transporting
the gas, as it is in the case of most gas pipeline companies, the
situation is more complex. For these circumstances, the toll is
defined in section 61 of the act as "the differential between the cost
to the company of the gas at the point where it enters its pipeline and
the amount for which the gas is sold by the company". The powers
of the board over the setting of prices and tolls were recently defined
by the Supreme Court of Canada. 24 In this case, the TransCanada
Pipeline Company had applied to the board for orders to fix a just
and reasonable rate that the company could charge for the
transportation of gas that it sold, under contract, to the
Saskatchewan Power Corporation. The company sought disallow-
ance, by the board, of the contract sale price, and sought the
substitution of a zone rate which the board had promulgated under
the Energy Administration Act. 25 The court held that the board was
empowered to deal with the price only incidentally to the fixing of
transportation tolls. Thus, the powers granted in Part IV do not
encompass the setting of prices and do not permit the board to act
outside the prescription of that part of the act. However, in Part III
of the Energy Administration Act, the price of natural gas that is
traded interprovincially or internationally is regulated. Section 51
provides that, if an agreement is entered into between the federal
government and a producer-province, the governor-in-council may
prescribe prices at which such gas can be sold in any area or zone in
24. Saskatchewan Power Corporation v. TransCanada Pipeline Limited (1982),
1-0 D. L. R. 3rd. 1.
25. See note 19, supra.
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Canada or at any point on Canada's international boundary. By an
agreement with the Province of Alberta in 1977, a price to be paid
for gas at the Alberta border, called the Imputed Alberta Border
Price, was struck. Thus, when the National Energy Board
determines the reasonable rates between the Alberta border and
some point either in Canada or on the international border, this rate,
when added to the Alberta Border Price, is the prescribed price
which takes the form of a formal board order and is published in the
Canada Gazette. The board continually reviews the tolls and prices
it sets and orders are regularly amended.
For sometime now, Canadian sales of natural gas to the United
States have been declining, due to the recession, competition from
low-cost alternative fuels, and American legislation which closely
controls gas prices. In addition, the Canadian price of natural gas,
which, at the time of this writing, is $4.94 per million cubic feet
and which was set in 1980 by an agreement between the American
and Canadian governments, is undeniably a factor. At present, the
matter is being discussed by the two governments.
(c) The Regulation of Electricity
Pursuant to section 83 of the act, exportations of electricity must
meet the statutory requirements for surplus and price. The
requirements, set out in section 6 of the National Energy Board Part
VI Regulations, list the criteria which the board may take into
account in making this determination, but, as a matter of practice,
only particular information about the application is usually
considered. 26 In determining the reasonableness of the price, the
board covers three general areas of questioning: does the export
recover its appropriate share of the costs incurred by the Canadian
transmission company? Is the export price not less than the price
charged to Canadian customers by the transmission company in the
general area of the proposed export? And does the export price
result in prices in the United States market that are close to those of
the cheapest energy alternative from indigenous sources?
2 7
Answering these questions has been relatively easy for the board
until lately, when the social costs and environmental effects of the
proposed exports of energy and power have caused considerable
discussion. This is well-illustrated in the recent application by
26. See note 15, supra.
27. This test was first used in the Westcoast decision, see note 21, supra.
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Ontario Hydro for the export of electricity generated by the nuclear
station on the Bruce Peninsula, in the Province of Ontario.
28
Environmentalists, led by the Department of the Environment,
made strong representations against the export, mainly on the
ground that Canada would then be generating nuclear energy for the
benefit of another country. However, despite representations made
in cabinet to defeat the export licence, approval was granted.
The export of electric power has been the subject of federal
regulation since 1907, and the board is empowered to issue
certificates for international power lines. However, until recently
there was no provision which expressly allowed for land to be
expropriated for the construction of international power lines,
although such a provision existed in the case of pipelines. As a
consequence of representations made by a utility in Alberta and by
the government of Newfoundland, an amendment was made to
section 43 of the act, such that the provisions regarding the
expropriation of lands for the construction of pipelines now apply to
the construction of international power lines. 
29
(d) Some Development Since 1980
The National Energy Program, announced in October 1980,
undeniably constitutes considerable government interference in the
Canadian economy. The avowed purposes of the program are to
achieve energy security; to provide the federal government with
sufficient revenue from petroleum sources, such that an effective
national energy policy can be developed; to permit, through private
and public sector corporations, greater involvement of Canadians in
energy programs; and to put into place an acceptable pricing
regime. To accomplish these ends, the program set out a new
pricing schedule for well-head blended crude oil, as well as a price
for natural gas, which would be linked to oil prices but which would
remain below them. These prices were finalized in an agreement
between the federal government and the Province of Alberta in
September 1981. In this agreement, some new taxes and charges
were proposed, along with the alteration of a number of old ones.
These proposals have since been reflected in the Energy
Administration Act of 1982.30 The program proposed the
28. In the Matter of an Application under Parts I, Ill, and VI of the National
Energy Board Act by Ontario Hydro, Reasons for Decision (March, 1982).
29. See note 1I, supra.
30. See note 19, supra.
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establishment of some additional crown corporations, such as
Petro-Canada International, which would explore for petroleum in
developing countries. In addition, a series of direct expenditures
and grants were envisaged which would provide incentives for oil
and gas discoveries and for household conversions to gas and
electricity, as well as funding for energy research.
At present, the program is in difficulty, due mainly to the fact that
oil prices have not continued to rise as was assumed at the start of
the program and in the subsequent Alberta Federal Agreement.
Although revisions are certainly in order, there is little question that
they will not lead to much deregulation in the industry. Nor would it
appear that the acts and various functions of the National Energy
Board would be greatly affected by any proposed revisions.
However, the recent economic recession has had its effect on the
megaprojects which were announced as an integral part of federal
economic policy. In particular, the following three with which the
National Energy Board was closely concerned have been affected.
The Northern Pipeline Act, passed in April 1978, provided the
authority for the construction of the first of these projects, a natural
gas pipeline in Canada along the Alaska Highway, as well as for the
creation of a Northern Pipeline Agency to oversee the construction
project. 3 1 Certain terms and conditions in the legislation require that
the company constructing the pipeline seek the approval of both the
board and the minister responsible for the Northern Pipeline Act.
The board's responsibilities relate primarily to the rate of return
schemes, to financing and tariffs, to approval of pipeline
specifications, and to the granting of leave to open orders. At the
time of writing, the construction of the pipeline has been postponed,
due to difficulties with the financing. Another megaproject, the
TransQuebec & Maritime (TQM) pipeline, has also been stalled.
32
The TQM pipeline is unlikely to be extended any further than
Quebec City for some time, although it was originally intended to
extend to Halifax and to supply many areas in New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia with western natural gas. But, while faced with
escalating costs and uncertainty about the marketing of Sable Island
gas, there is no guarantee that the pipeline will ever reach these two
Maritime provinces. The third megaproject is the so-called Arctic
31. S. C. (1978), c. 20.
32. In The Matter of an Application under Part III of the National Energy Board
Act by TransQuebec and Maritime Pipeline Inc., Reasons for Decision (July,
1981).
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Pilot Project, which consists of a scheme to transport liquified
natural gas from the Arctic by tanker and to inject the gas into the
TQM line at certain points in Nova Scotia. The hearing on this
application was recently stopped because the project's sponsors may
export the gas to Europe, rather than to the United States. The
postponement served as notice that the board would not approve
projects when important evidence, such as the source of financing,
firm contracts of the sale of the gas, or adequate environmental
data, was not forthcoming.
II1. Regulation by the National Energy Board
The National Energy Board performs its statutory mandate through
its three main functions, the administrative function, the legislative
function, and the quasi-judicial function. 33 In the use of each of
these functions, some form of hearing may be held. Section 20 of
the act reads:
Subject to subsection (2), hearings before the Board with regard
to the issue, revocation or suspension of certificates or licences
for the exportation of gas or power or the importation of gas or
for leave to abandon the operation of a pipeline or international
power line shall be public.
Although the board has held hearings on certificate, licence, and
rate applications since its inception in 1959, the precise meaning of
this section has not been authoritatively determined. With respect to
form, Mr. Justice Cattanach, in Re A. G. of Manitoba and National
Energy Board, concluded that "because the statute and the
regulations contemplate a panoply of a full adversary hearing it
follows that the word hearing in section 20 of the Act must have
attributed to it the same meaning as it has in a court of law."
3 4
However, the precise ambit of the section is still not clear.
Applications for orders for the exportation of oil do not require
hearings. However, even if a hearing is not required by statute or by
regulation, it would seem that fundamental law might require an
oral hearing. 35 In practice, the board usually holds hearings on
33. See note 8, supra, at 9ff.
34. (1974),48 D. L. R. (3rd) 73, 91.
35. Mr. Justice Cattanach said in the Manitoba case, note 32, ibid, at 89:
I fully appreciate that in many instances a hearing need not be an oral one but
may be on written representations. If a tribunal is left by the legislation creating
it with unfettered discretion as to how to proceed then the tribunal can work out
an acceptable procedure that does not include an oral hearing, but even then
there may be cases where fairness may dictate an oral hearing.
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applications for certificates to construct pipelines that exceed
twenty-five miles in length. 36 Applications for export licences are
also the subject of hearings, but the board has wide powers to create
regulations that authorize orders for specific types of exports. For
example, emergency imports, exports of gas, and exports of
propane and ethylene that occur at certain times and do not exceed
specified amounts may be authorized by order. The issue of licences
for the export and import of oil does not require a hearing, due to the
fact that section 20 of the act, when originally passed in 1959, did
not include the word "oil". When the act was proclaimed in 1970
and its provisions were extended to include oil, the word "oil" was
still not included in section 20.
(a) The Administrative Function
The regulatory acts of the board are usually performed by the
administrative function, that is, without hearings. A list of many of
these acts can be found in section 2 of the National Energy Board's
Rules of Practice and Procedure. 37 They include applications for
exemption orders; orders for the export of gas, oil, and electricity;
orders relating to traffic, tolls, and tariffs; and various crossing
orders under sections 76 and 77. Most of these applications are
handled expeditiously at regular weekly meetings which are
presided over by board members who are selected for their expertise
in particular areas and arranged in panels for the quick dispatch of
the matters at hand. Although hearings are usually not held to
dispose of these applications, they may be held in particular
circumstances. For example, a hearing was held on an application,
under section 72, regarding compensation payable to the owner of a
mine as a result of its severance by the pipeline. Several public
hearings have also been held on applications for the approval of
plans, specifications, and books of reference, pursuant to section 28
of the act. These hearings came about as a result of strong
complaints that were voiced by landowners in the vicinity of the
proposed pipeline and which were made with regard to its location
and its effect on agricultural lands.
These hearings now have a degree of statutory sanction. Recent
amendments to the act have modernized the procedure used by
pipeline companies, under federal jurisdiction, to acquire lands for
36. See note 5, supra, s. 49.
37. C. R. C. (1978), vol. XI, c. 1057.
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their pipelines. It is expected that the provisions will greatly expand
the recognition of the rights of landowners who are adversely
affected, not only so far as the compensation they receive is
concerned, but also by providing them the right to a public hearing
during which an inquiry will be made into the appropriateness of the
route selected by the company in question.3 8 Section 29 of the act
requires, in part, that the company prepare and submit a plan, a
profile, and a book of reference to the board after the certificate has
been issued. The amendments require that notice of these
documents be served on all owners affected by the proposal and that
the documents be published. If the detailed route is opposed by any
party that would be adversely affected, a public hearing is to be held
in the area. The amendments provide for compensation, inspection,
negotiation, and arbitration to be carried out as required, and even
specify the form that the land acquisition agreement between the
company and the owner of the lands is to take. They also allow for
the board to create additional regulations to cover its various
operations. There is little doubt that these amendments will increase
considerably the number of hearings that come before the board.
To date, the board has not made extensive use of inspectors or
examiners to report on matters relating to the safety of pipelines or
the use of land. If the inspectors or examiners merely report facts to
the board, then the board would be performing an administrative
function and no further action on its part would be required.
However, if the reports of the inspectors or examiners reveal that
the rights of individuals are being affected in any way, the dictates
of fair play may indicate that some further action to apprise affected
parties of the proceedings is necessary.
3 9
(b) The Legislative Function
An important part of the exercise of the legislative function is
subsidiary law-making, that is, the making of rules and regulations
under the enabling statute. Certain rules which delimit the lawful
exercise of this function are prescribed by the judiciary. For
example, the subsidiary law-making must be reasonable in relation
to the purpose that it is intended to achieve, it must be made in good
faith, and it must comply with all conditions, both subsequent and
38. S. C. (1980-81), c. 80.
39. Board members sometime act analogously to examiners when appointed under
section 14 of the act.
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precedent, that are contained in the enabling act. 40 The laws are also
governed by statutory requirements, contained in the Statutory
Instruments Act. 4 1 This act requires that most rules, regulations,
and orders be enacted subject to the approval, by the legal officers
of the Privy Council Office, of their form and compliance with legal
standards. In addition, there is a Standing Joint Committee on
Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments. It is a parliamentary
body and its function is to maintain close control over the
subordinate legislation enacted by those to whom Parliament has
delegated such a power.
Since the inception of the board, it has been its practice to
publicize all of its important proposed subordinate legislation and to
request comments on it. When new regulations, such as the gas and
oil accounting regulations or the pipeline safety regulations, are
proposed, or when information is required for, say, an order to set
tolls or tariffs, the board will mail copies of the proposed changes to
all parties concerned, requesting replies and information. When
the replies are received, they are carefully read and analyzed and, if
it is deemed necessary, an informal hearing may be held to further
explain the situation and to obtain additional information. Although
the board decides whether or not to send the proposed regulations to
the Privy Council for approval, it will not do so until the regulations
are felt to be basically sound and have the support of a large
proportion of the parties involved. Once approved, the rules,
regulations, and orders are continually reviewed and, where
necessary, are amended to reflect current conditions. This has been
the practice until recently, when, along with several other
departments and agencies, the board introduced the practice of
publishing a document, called the "Regulatory Agenda", three
times a year. This document not only lists proposed legislative
changes, but also provides information on all significant develop-
ments during the four-month period it covers. Perhaps of greatest
importance, the Regulatory Agenda lists the details of amendments
to its rules and regulations. For example, the third issue covered the
activities at the board from September through November, 1982,
including recent decisions issued by the board, information
regarding pending decisions, descriptions of hearings in progress, a
list of hearing applications that had been filed, and references to
40. See, for example, Driedger, Subordinate Legislation (1960), 38 Can. B. R. I.
41. S.C.(1970-71-72),c.38.
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nonhearing applications (those which do not require hearings). In
particular, this issue served notice that information that had been
required for some specific situations was "in various stages of
preparation" and advised that, in most cases, "when ready, it will
be issued for comments by interested parties." Among the
amendments mentioned were those made to the Oil Pipeline
Regulations .42
(c) The Quasi-Judicial Function
The exercise of the quasi-judicial function demands most of the time
and energy of the board. The major concern in this area is to
expedite procedures, while giving adequate time and attention to the
representations made by all interested parties. This must be done in
a formal, public hearing, the procedures of which must be
analogous to those of a trial conducted by the regular law courts. 43
The following comments will briefly set out the procedures
followed by the board before, during, and after a hearing. Although
these procedures are usually complied with, they can be modified as
required for particular circumstances.
From the time that an application arrives, it is important that the
board not only be impartial, but appear impartial. Most importantly,
it cannot consult with one party to the exclusion of the other party or
parties. Some latitude may be allowed in this area for the benefit of
a party that is unfamiliar with board practice or procedure, but in
general, the receipt of the application commences the hearing and
subsequent consultations must take the form of formal preliminary
meetings or pre-hearing conferences. Such meetings are encouraged
not only because they give some familiarity with the board's
procedures, but because they can do much to expedite and simplify
the proceedings. For example, oral argument may be deemed
superfluous in a particular situation and, thus, be dispensed with.
Similarly, discovery procedure may be recommended in specific
areas or lines of questioning may, in various ways, be modified. In
addition, the board has the power to modify its precedural rules
prior to the hearing in order to facilitate more effective and
expeditious proceedings.
Because the board (among other agencies which are required to
conduct public hearings) is now constrained by the trial procedure,
42. See note 33, supra.
43. See note 8, supra, at 32ff.
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it must take care to follow its Rules of Practice and Procedure and to
consider carefully the common law rules of natural justice so far as
they are applicable. Thus, notices of hearings are published and sent
to all interested parties, including companies, government depart-
ments, associations, and individuals, the names and addresses of
whom are kept on extensive mailing lists that are continually
updated. In general, the contents of board files are available on an
ad hoc basis. If applied for at a hearing, information may be granted
where the matter is not delicate or where no prejudice will be
suffered by any party. However, studies and reports that were
carried out by members of the board's staff are usually considered
confidential. To date, the board has not had to defend this position
in an open hearing, due mainly to the fact that, wherever possible,
the board has accommodated requests.
During the hearings, the use of "canned", or written, testimony
that is defended by its authors is encouraged. Such testimony is
expeditious and usually allows more time for effective cross-
examination. It is now used extensively by the board, particularly in
hearings regarding rate changes. Testimony provided by panels of
witnesses is also used by the board to expedite proceedings. A
panel, composed of two or more witnesses, can give a more
effective presentation than an individual can, as its members can
assist each other with the reporting of facts, can support the others'
opinions, and can lend credence to specific positions. Although
hearsay evidence has always been permitted within limits, the board
is careful to rely on facts and evidence that it receives at the
hearings. Section 45 of the act prescribes that the board "shall
consider the objections of any interested party" and states that the
board has the power to determine conclusively whether or not a
person is interested. Although concern about the unmanageable
number of hearings and the other extensive proceedings is
frequently present, the board has consistently given a wide
interpretation to the phrase "interested persons".
The board's post-hearing procedure is designed to ensure that the
final decision is that favoured by the panel members. All
collaboration between the board's staff and the panel members is
done through a staff coordinator, who arranges for the confirmation
of facts and evidence, as required. Also ensuring the impartiality of
the final decision is the requirement that the individuals who
participate in it hear all of the evidence presented. An apparent
exception to this rule is the provision in section 14, which may be
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adopted by the board and which enables just one authorized member
of the board to be apprised of evidence contained in a report.
There is, of course, a paradox imbedded in the requirement of
impartiality. As has been described previously, the National Energy
Board Act clearly states that administrative agencies should not be
unduly influenced and that they should not be dictated to by
anybody, particularly by the government of the day. Although legal
cases indicate that, when rendering decisions, a strict detachment
from outside influences is called for, it would hardly be reasonable
to expect the agency to be oblivious to the policy of the current
government. In fact, the National Energy Board Act, in section 44,
requires the board to make its decisions with "regard to all relevant




As the result of recent developments, in particular the decreasing
price of oil on world markets, some modifications in Canada's
National Energy Program and the relaxation of some controls may
be expected in the near future. However, there is little likelihood
that extensive deregulation, in the sense of the entire energy sector
or even a large portion of it being regulated only by market forces,
will occur. It can only be expected that the National Energy Board
and other agencies in the field will allow more efficient government
by removing unnecessary, costly, inefficient, and repetitious
regulations and procedures.
The government sets energy policy and formulates the statutory
framework. Policy is expressed in broad terms, as it was intended
by the legislature to apply to many different circumstances. Even if
the policy is expressed concisely, much remains to be given
meaning and substance by the officials who administer it. However,
if good administration is to be achieved, statutory functions and
powers, while being broad enough to allow flexibility, must be
specific enough to make them meaningful for application to
everyday affairs. If the board is to have the powers of a court of
record, then its powers should be listed with some precision and the
statutory provisions for enforcement should be adequate to
accomplish the task that Parliament has delegated to it. Adequate
44. See, supra, at 20.
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powers should be given to inspectors to oversee and supervise
projects, if such activities are considered to be necessary for
attaining the goals of the enactment. These powers should also be
expressed in such a manner that they will be consistent with the
powers of other agencies. Although different goals will necessitate
different powers, the powers to perform similar administrative,
advisory, and regulatory functions should be expressed in a similar
manner in all statutes, in order to ensure their consistent application.
Furthermore, special attention should be given to making
regulations that are compatible with set policy and the realization of
specific goals. The National Energy Board would appear to be
appropriately organized to accommodate these alterations. For
example, its regulatory power enabled the governor-in-council to
control the pricing of natural gas 45 and, similarly, the governor-in-
council was given a more specific method of control over the date
on which a licence becomes effective. 4
6
Recently, much concern has been expressed about the political
and functional relationships between administrative agencies, and
about the amount of control over these agencies that it is appropriate
for the executive branch of government to exercise. A detailed
examination of this important subject is beyond the scope of this
article, but some concluding remarks will be made on the position
of the National Energy Board in this regard. First, Parliament
controls the appointment of the members of the board. Although
these appointments are made by the governor-in-council, they are
subject to careful screening by the Privy Council Office. Indeed,
members of the board have, in the past, proved themselves to be
experienced, capable, and dedicated people. Second, Parliament is
also in complete control of enabling legislation and amendments
thereto. The recent amendments, most of which were of a
"housekeeping" nature, confirm that the act is a careful and
appropriate method of dealing with important aspects of the energy
situation. 47 Third, although no provision has been made for policy
directives, the legislation is broad enough to permit them. Together
with the board's practice of dealing with rules, orders, and
regulations in a public forum, it can be expected that policy
directives and changes will be published before they are adopted.
45. See note 15, supra, s. 8.
46. See note 11, supra.
47. See, supra, at 40.
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Finally, the government also exerts control through the re-
quirements, found in section 90 of the act, for the tabling in
Parliament of annual reports of the board. In all, the degree of
control that is, at present, exercised by the government over the
activities of this important administrative agency would appear to be
adequate.
